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Abstract
This article uses a transaction cost economics (TCE) approach to analyze cooperation 
between nonprofits, governments and firms, namely, hybrids. This is a different concept from 
hybrids in the nonprofit management literature. In TCE, hybrids are organizational modes of 
transactions where the parties contribute limited resources, for which they establish modes of 
coordination. This article explains how the concept of hybrids can be applied to research on 
nonprofits, illustrating this with an analysis of foundations lobbying in the European Union 
(EU). As regulatory transactions are organized through hybrids, this article proposes that 
foundations are likely to participate in EU policymaking for regulatory transactions, which are 
too costly to solve individually. The results show that foundations participate in different EU 
regulatory environments; significantly, this includes environments with high coordination 
costs. 
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2Introduction
Increased cooperation among nonprofits is inspiring research on the factors that lead to the 
formation, transformation, and demise of nonprofits’ cooperation with governments and firms 
(AL-Tabbaa, Leach, and March, 2014; Guo and Acar, 2005; Schiller and Almog-Bar, 2013; 
Witesman and Heiss, 2016). Past research has identified the characteristics of some forms of 
nonprofit cooperation, but it is imperative that researchers gain an in-depth understanding of 
nonprofit cooperation by adopting a comparative perspective that systematically considers 
nonprofits’ alternative modes of cooperation. This article proposes a specific transaction cost 
economics (TCE) approach that studies cooperation called hybrids. The hybrids TCE 
approach offers an organizational perspective that models alternatives available for nonprofits 
to cooperate, as well as the mode of cooperation most suitable for their purposes.
Before continuing, it should be noted that the nonprofit management literature also studies 
hybrids; however, its emphasis is not on the transaction. Hybrids in nonprofit management 
refer to organizations combining market and public logics: earning revenue and creating 
social value (e.g., Jäger & Schröer, 2014). In other words, hybrids constitute a type of 
nonprofit (e.g., Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brandsen, de Donk, & Putters, 2005; Jäger & Schröer, 
2014). Analytically, hybrids have been introduced into nonprofit management to account for 
wider classifications of nonprofits (Brandsen, de Donk, & Putters, 2005) to understand the 
trend toward “marketization”, for example (Jäger & Schröer, 2014).
In TCE, hybrids are modes of organization for transactions of intermediate asset specificity 
that are not efficiently organized through hierarchies or markets (see Section 1). Hybrid 
modes of organization are “forms that involve multiple partners pooling some strategic 
decision rights, and even some property rights, while keeping distinct ownership over key 
3assets, so that they require specific governance to monitor and discipline their interactions” 
(Ménard, 2010: 176). As a result, TCE hybrids have been introduced to account for a larger 
number of alternative structures of production (Williamson, 1991). In other words, TCE 
assumes that organizations — whether governments, nonprofits, or firms — pursue their 
transactions through a mix of markets (e.g., the procurement of computers), hierarchies (e.g., 
hiring specialized labor), and hybrids (e.g., cooperating to organize the delivery of a good or 
service). 
By studying hybrids, TCE contributes to the analysis of an increasing number of transactions 
organized through cooperation between firms and between firms and governments (e.g., 
Ménard, 2004; Jolink & Niesten, 2012). Hybrids have been useful in understanding new 
forms of adaptation to uncertainty and explaining when and how cooperation constitutes a 
comparative advantage for organizations. As a result, franchise, subcontracting, supply chain, 
and joint venture studies, among others, have considerably benefited from this approach. 
To the best of my knowledge, TCE accounts of nonprofits have not considered hybrids as one 
of the alternative modes that nonprofits can use to structure their transactions (a few have 
done it indirectly such as Kumar & Malegeant, 2006; Leat, 2016; Oster, 1992, 1996; Young, 
1989; Young & Faulk, 2010). Consequently, the overall purpose of this article is to explain 
how hybrids provide explanatory power to analyze nonprofits’ adaptability to collective 
action problems. 
To this end, I examine the case of foundations lobbying in the European Union (EU). Through 
lobbying, several types of interest groups contribute to elaborating policies and providing 
specific information and skills. Consequently, I argue that lobbying is a mechanism that 
foundations use to organize regulatory transactions. Regulatory transactions tackle 
4asymmetries that arise from collective action through cooperative arrangements. As I explain 
later, regulatory transactions belong to what Commons (1950) defines as rationing, one of the 
three fundamental TCE transactions. Rationing takes place between different organizations, 
such as supply chains, joint ventures, and policymaking; it can also take place between 
stakeholders in an organization, such as when a firm’s board members define compensation 
schemes or budgets. 
Although many studies have examined the influence of foundations in politics (e.g., Ball, 
2008, 2012; Ferris, 2009; Kretchmar, Sondel, & Ferrare, 2014; Mandeville, 2007; Roelofs, 
2003; Stone, 2010), their direct participation in lobbying, as part of the interest group 
collective, has been largely neglected. This is partly the result of US barriers to foundation 
lobbyinga (see Mandeville, 2007; although this may change with a revision of the Johnson 
Amendmentb), barriers that do not exist in the EU. Therefore, the EU constitutes a unique case 
with which to examine this question.
Anheier and Daly (2007: 71) found that European foundations have only a marginal interest 
in EU politics and constitute the “latecomers” on the EU scene. In fact, the EU Transparency 
Register (TR, 2017), a comprehensive official database providing information on individuals 
and entities lobbying in the EU, reveals that the number of foundations has been increasing 
steadily since 2008 (Graph 1) (registered organizations must update their data every year; 
therefore, inactive organizations tend to disappear). This trend raises a question seldom asked 
by researchers: “What compels foundations to lobby?” I argue that foundations participate in 
EU policymaking for regulatory transactions that are too costly to solve inside the 
organization. 
5Graph 1. Number of foundations registered in the EU Transparency Register per year.
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6The argument proceeds in three parts. Focusing on the case of foundations and emphasizing 
hybrids, the first point explains the three main elements of TCE: defining the type of 
transaction, the alternative modes of organization for transactions, and the efficient alignment 
principle. The second point explains regulatory transactions as hybrids and derives 
propositions to explain foundations lobbying in the EU based on Wilson’s (1974, 1989) 
model of policy environments. The third point explains EU lobbying as a hybrid mode of 
organization. Although EU lobbying is frequently described as a market arrangement for 
procuring transactions, I argue that EU lobbying lacks the characteristics of autonomous 
adaptation and the negligible control arrangements of markets. For the remainder of the paper, 
in the fourth section, the foundations registered in the TR are analyzed in light of the 
propositions derived in the model presented in the second section. The fifth section concludes 
the discussion, highlights this article’s key findings, and offers recommendations for future 
research.
1. Transaction costs through the lens of foundations
Transaction costs are the costs of “planning, adapting and monitoring” a transaction 
(Williamson, 1985: 20). These costs include ex ante costs, which are the costs of “drafting, 
negotiating and safeguarding an agreement,” and ex post costs, which appear when the 
completion of a task diverges from what the agreement stipulated (Williamson, 1985: 20). 
Both types of costs are interdependent and need to be defined a priori. 
1.1. Type of transactions 
The costs of transactions vary according to three dimensions: asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and frequency (Williamson, 1985, 1999). Asset specificity refers to the degree to which the 
assets for a transaction can be easily assigned to other transactions without losing value; 
therefore, the less likely the assets are to be relocated, the more specific and costly they are. 
7Uncertainty is the extent to which the implicated parties’ bounded rationality (time and 
cognitive limitations for processing information) and opportunism (deceitful behavior) affect 
the completion of a transaction; therefore, when asset specificity increases, the likelihood of 
uncertainty increases and mechanisms of control are needed, adding costs to the transaction. 
Finally, frequency stipulates that the more costly the transaction is due to asset specificity and 
uncertainty, the longer the relationship between parties will tend to last. Accordingly, the 
costs of transactions will rise as the costs of all three dimensions increase, and the transaction 
will be described as idiosyncratic (Figure 1a). 
To illustrate, imagine two types of transactions: one with low costs and one with high costs. 
In the first, a foundation with the general mission to improve education deploys a program to 
buy computers. The funding for computers can easily be redeployed (to buy books instead), 
and the implicated parties (computer providers and the foundation) can assess the outcome 
(the quality and number of computers purchased). The relationship between the parties ends 
once the computers are delivered and paid for. 
In the second, a foundation with the specific purpose of saving an endangered species will 
bear high asset and uncertainty costs because the land used by the species cannot be 
redeployed and because the care of the species requires distinct environmental and veterinary 
knowledge. The veterinary care may be an idiosyncratic transaction. In contrast to land 
cleaners who do not require specialist knowledge, a veterinarian needs specialized knowledge 
to conserve the endangered species. While the foundation hires land cleaners in spot markets, 
specialized veterinarians are difficult to find in spot markets (see Williamson, Wachter, & 
Harris, 1975 for more on job idiosyncrasy and spot and structured labor markets). In other 
words, alternative sources to find specialized veterinarians are considerably limited compared 
to land cleaners or veterinarians for domestic animals. Accordingly, it is hard to sell the 
8veterinarian’s specialization in spot markets, where veterinarians for domestic animals rather 
than for endangered species are most valued, without losing productive value. Moreover, ex 
post costs occur because the veterinarian will specialize in the treatment of the species in 
question, which may not be marketable without losing productive value (see Williamson, 
Wachter, & Harris, 1975; Williamson, 1985: 240 on task idiosyncrasy). Meanwhile, the 
foundation will invest in the veterinarian’s skill development, which is hardly redeployable 
should the veterinarian leave the foundation. This ex post status shows a “small numbers 
bargaining situation” (Williamson, Wachter, & Harris 1975: 256; Arrow, 1969) where, due to 
the specific knowledge acquired, the veterinarian is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis 
competitors to adapt to unforeseeable changes; he or she may be tempted to act 
opportunistically. In sum, the relationship between the veterinarian and the foundation bears 
sizeable transaction costs due to the veterinarian’s knowledge advantage vis-à-vis the 
foundation (bounded rationality), his or her advantage vis-à-vis competitors due to his or her 
specific knowledge (small numbers), the possibility that he or she uses the advantage to act 
opportunistically, and the need to frequently adapt to unforeseen circumstances that may 
affect the endangered species (uncertainty). Consequently, when the foundation’s need for 
veterinary care is significant due to knowledge specificity, the high uncertainty regarding the 
wellbeing of the species, and the high frequency of demand of services, the relationship will 
tend to be organized in a hierarchical manner (Figure 1b).
A note of caution should be included. Opportunism may operate differently in nonprofits than 
it does in for-profits. Following Valentinov (2008a, 2008b), the alignment of the intrinsic 
motivation of the veterinarian with the foundation mission—both have an intrinsic interest in 
conserving endangered species—may weaken his or her willingness to act opportunistically. 
According to Valentinov, a mechanism that nonprofits use to control their employees’ 
opportunistic behavior and to ensure motivation alignment is setting lower wages (2008b). 
9This may be the case for endangered species veterinarians (e.g., James, 2016). The US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics pointed out that despite the increasing demand and significant 
requirements of specialization, endangered species veterinarians earn lower salaries than 
veterinarians for domestic animals because they work for governments, research institutions, 
or nonprofits rather than private practices (2017). 
1.2. Alternative modes of organization
Adaptation is an essential factor when assessing the suitability of different modes of 
organization for different types of transactions (Williamson, 1991). Adaptation refers to the 
incentives the mode of organization provides to adjust to any changes that appear during the 
transaction (i.e., the incentives to adjust to ex post costs). Markets are considered high 
incentive structures because the price system provides the necessary motivations for parties to 
adjust autonomously to changes without the need for costly control arrangements. 
However, as transaction costs increase, the relationship between buyers and suppliers 
becomes interdependent; thus, the parties’ utility maximization becomes dependent on one 
another. One party’s asset investments are affected by another party’s asset investments, and 
vice versa. In these cases, adaptation does not take place autonomously through price systems, 
but through increasingly complex and frequent bargaining for every change. Bargaining for 
every change can add costs to the point where the costs exceed the benefits of the transaction. 
To reduce the added costs of frequent bargaining, the parties may estimate advantageously to 
create strong control arrangements, which are easy to adjust. This is how hierarchies 
economize on transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). Hierarchies correspond to cases where 
strong control arrangements (the use of authority) are deemed less costly than frequent 
bargaining to accomplish transactions. 
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Consequently, hierarchies are on the right end when defining modes of organization as a 
continuum because of the low incentive structures for autonomous adaptation and strong 
control arrangements (Figure 1b). Markets are on the left end because of high incentive 
structures for autonomous adaptation with negligible control arrangement. Meanwhile, 
hybrids are in the middle because they entail intermediate incentive structures and control 
arrangements (Williamson, 1979, 1985, 1991). 
Hybrids are organizational modes where the parties contribute limited assets, for which they 
establish modes of coordination. This requires the parties to “maintain distinct property rights 
and remain independent residual claimants” for all but any shared assets (Ménard, 2004: 351). 
As with hierarchies, the decision to organize a transaction through a hybrid mode depends on 
the difficulty of predicting ex post costs and the risk of uncertainty, but what is crucial for 
hybrids is identifying the opportunity to seize positive externalities. Ménard (2013) argued 
that cost minimization is an insufficient justification for the parties to decide to organize a 
transaction through coordination. Crucially, it is the identification of added value, such as 
increased scale and scope, complementarity, and learning effects, that moves the parties to 
engage in hybrids. As a result, identifying “mutual dependence as a source of value” (Ménard, 
2010: 179) drives the parties to share both the risks and the returns (Ménard, 2004).  
A specific structural setting is necessary to coordinate the distribution of returns and risks due 
to the collective character of hybrids. Hybrids rely on a coordinating entity to which the 
parties cede property rights, decision rights, and the distribution of benefits from the shared 
assets. Therefore, in contrast to hierarchies and markets, where adaptation is effected 
autonomously or through authority, the adaptation of hybrids is effected through coordination, 
which is frequently embodied by a “strategic center” (Ménard, 2010: 178). Nevertheless, the 
efficacy of the coordinating entity depends on the cooperation of the parties; therefore, when 
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parties refuse to cooperate, hybrids may refer to external authorities, such as courts, to enforce 
the entity’s resolutions. Moreover, facilitating coordination depends on the existence of 
information systems that reduce uncertainty, such as joint datasets (Ménard, 2013: 1091).        
1.3. Efficient alignments
Comparing all three modes of organization, markets have the lowest transaction costs; 
nevertheless, the efficiency of each mode of organization must be defined in relation to the 
costs of the transaction. This observation is the economizing principle—or efficient alignment 
hypothesis (see Williamson, 1991: 278 on sub-optimal alignment)—on which TCE rests 
(Williamson, 1985) (Figure 1c).  
This principle requires an examination of how foundations determine whether the costs of 
engaging in policymaking are compensated by the anticipated returns. Returning to the 
examples presented above, I now consider whether the transactions between the first 
foundation and the computer suppliers, and the second foundation and the veterinarian, are 
best carried out through markets, hybrids, or hierarchies. 
The transaction between the first foundation and the computer suppliers is a standard 
transaction where the identity of the suppliers is irrelevant as long as they provide the 
standard computers required. No critical changes during the transaction are expected because 
it is possible to assess ex ante and ex post costs; consequently, control arrangements are 
unnecessary. Accordingly, the most efficient mode to organize the transaction is the market, 
where the foundation determines the characteristics and number of computers required, asks 
for estimates from different suppliers, and buys from the supplier that presents the best 
quality–price relation. 
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As explained above, the transaction between the second foundation and the veterinarian is 
idiosyncratic. If the foundation decides to adopt the cheapest mode of 
governance—markets—it must (re)negotiate contracts every time an essential change takes 
place, such as members of the species reproducing, getting ill, or dying. This mode of 
organization is thus highly inefficient, since the species’ well being must be placed on hold 
while new contracts are negotiated. A more efficient solution would be a hierarchical 
transaction where the foundation develops a monitoring system that determines when the 
veterinarian is not acting in the foundation’s best interests so it can apply corrective measures 
(e.g., Cheung, 1983; Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985: 206 and 240). It is true that developing 
the monitoring system is costly, but it ensures that the transaction runs smoothly despite any 
changes; therefore, the returns compensate the transaction costs.
Consider a third case. For the second foundation, successfully accomplishing its mission 
depends on habitat management, particularly, banning invasive alien species (IAS) introduced 
by humans. The foundation has several options to discourage and control the effect of IAS.  
First, it may contract with a firm to develop IAS rules and control mechanisms. The ex ante 
costs involve finding the right partner of trade in a spot market, and the ex post costs involve 
devising forms to assess and monitor IAS rules and control mechanisms. Second, the 
foundation may internally develop IAS rules and control mechanisms. In this case, the ex ante 
costs involve elaborating, adopting, and enforcing rules to control the introduction of IAS, for 
which it needs specific knowledge that the board may lack. Here, the ex post cost is generated 
from devising a form to monitor the performance of IAS rules and control mechanisms. 
In order to identify the most efficient mode to organize the control of IAS introduction, we 
must consider that this is a transaction with high frequency (an offense can take place at any 
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time) and a degree of bounded rationality (rule effectiveness cannot be fully assessed ex ante, 
and monitoring is necessary). Therefore, the first alternative may be less efficient.  
However, the third alternative would be more efficient than the second. Here, the foundation 
partners with agents concerned with controlling the introduction of IAS. In other words, the 
most efficient mode of organization would be to pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2010) with 
actors who have the specific expertise and capacity, such as interest groups, politicians, and 
civil servants, to create rules and control arrangements. 
Foundations can use different types of partnerships to pursue this goal (e.g., Young & Faulk, 
2010). Continuing with the IAS regulation example, I focus on their participation in 
policymaking. Regulating IAS will help the foundation to reduce the cost of rule elaboration 
and monitoring by including nonprofits, legal advisors, authorities, and policy experts with 
specific knowledge on IAS who will, for instance, expand the scope of scenarios and cases of 
the offenses covered. As a result, the foundation is better protected from uncertainty. A 
cooperative approach to IAS regulation will reduce monitoring and control costs by creating a 
comprehensive mode of control by which specific authorities are assigned the duty of 
implementation (ministries, local governments, police, and courts). Finally, as expected in a 
hybrid mode of organization, the foundation and the partners may identify added value. 
Larger deterrent effects on offenders and increased scope of action, which will help to achieve 
the goals more efficiently, are two examples of added value. These were some of the 
arguments used to develop EU legislation no. 1143/2014 on IAS (Genovesi & Shine, 2004; 
Kettunen et al., 2008; Stokes et al., 2006). One of the members of the working group on this 
EU regulationc was the European Centre for Nature Conservation (ECNC), a foundation with 
headquarters in the Netherlands which is part of the empirical study.
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2. Regulatory transactions as hybrid modes of organization
As firms and nonprofits, public agency transactions can be organized through alternative 
modes (Moe, 1995, 2007; Williamson, 1999; Wilson, 1989) (Graph 2). For example, 
government computer supply may be best carried out through markets, as was the case for the 
foundation above (for more about procurement transactions, see Williamson, 1999; Wilson, 
1989: 121). Meanwhile, transactions that require authority and command, such as foreign 
affairs and the military, may be best conducted through hierarchies (for more on sovereign 
transactions, see Williamson, 1999; Wilson, 1989: 359).
This study concerns transactions of a third kind: regulatory transactions (Graph 2). These 
transactions reduce uncertainty by addressing asymmetries (e.g., endangered species–invasive 
species, employees–employers, etc.) with specific assets (Williamson, 1999; Wilson, 1989). 
Regulatory transactions tackle asymmetries rising from collective action (Commons, 1950); 
these transactions are not exclusive to public agency—for example, boards of firms and 
cooperative assemblies also deal with regulatory transactions (Commons, 1950: 56). 
Regulatory transactions adopt hybrid modes of organization because they regulate collective 
action. Interest groups, politicians, and civil servants contribute expertise and capital to 
creating a coordinating entity (e.g., policies, agencies, courts, etc.).d It is important to 
understand the mention that it has been argued that Commons’ rationing transactions – to 
which, I proposed in the introduction, regulatory transactions belong – are suitable for 
understanding nonprofits because, by highlighting common interests between parties, the 
transactions consider the public good character of nonprofits, an aspect allegedly neglected by 
the new institutionalism on which most of this article is rooted (Valentinov, 2009, 2012). As it 
is observed in this article, this proposition is worth being empirically tested because not all the 
regulatory transactions nonprofits participate in are characterized in terms proposed by 
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institutionalists – see below, for instance, the interest group environment and the 
entrepreneurial environment (also Moe, 2011).
Wilson (1974) explained that the causes and organization of regulatory transactions in public 
agency depend on how the perceived costs and benefits of the regulation are distributed. 
Uncertainty about costs and benefits increases interest group activity; moreover, the 
distribution of costs and benefits creates policy environments (i.e., modes of organization 
where interest groups act distinctively) (Wilson, 1989: 72) (Figure 2). 
In the clientelist environment, interest groups belong to a specific community, such as an 
industry, and are interested in regulation as a means of improving comparative advantage. 
This kind of regulation requires knowledge that the industry will share with government 
authorities in order to find satisfactory solutions. In the interest group environment, the groups 
represent different communities with competing intentions, resulting in winners and losers. 
The variety of groups is useful for civil servants and politicians to build their legitimacy; 
therefore, this environment is highly politicized (Williamson, 1999; Wilson, 1989). In the 
entrepreneurial environment, the groups bearing the costs belong to a specific community, 
such as an industry, but in contrast with the clientelist environment, they resist regulation. As 
most of this regulation is the result of “attacks” on public interest, politicians adopt an 
entrepreneurial attitude (Wilson, 1989: 80). In majoritarian environments, neither the 
beneficiaries nor those who bear the cost of regulation can be identified as groups or 
organized. An example of majoritarian environments is the one that led to EU legislation no. 
1143/2014 on IAS; here, the beneficiaries are all of the species that the regulation protects 
from harm by IAS. The costs are borne by agents categorized as “offenders” and by the public 
agencies enforcing the law.
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Figure 1. Three aspects of transaction costs
Source: Own elaboration
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Following Williamson (1991: 284), the transaction costs of these regulations can be estimated 
as public agency costs of governance and asset specificity (Graph 2). As a result, 
entrepreneurial environments are closer to markets, whereas majority environments are closer 
to hierarchies. However, Wilson argued that interest groups increase their activity when they 
perceive “threats” to their costs and benefits (1974: 136). Accordingly, if certain threats to 
costs and benefits increase interest group activity more than uncertain threats, then it is 
expected that the curve of interest group participation would decrease proportionally to public 
agency transaction costs (Graph 2). This proposition is examined further in the empirical 
analysis below. Nevertheless, the ECNC’s participation in IAS legislation suggests that 
foundations are not only driven by threats, but also by opportunities to increase benefits 
(again, added value is an important driver for hybrids). In fact, Wilson (1989: 83) suggested 
that nonprofits, particularly foundations, have played an important role in representing 
dispersed interests in majoritarian environments; therefore, nonprofits may follow a different 
logic from other interest groups.
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Graph 2. Public agency transactions and modes of organization
 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1991) and Wilson (1974, 1989)
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3. EU lobbying as a hybrid mode of organization
Notwithstanding this explanation of regulatory transactions as intermediate transactions, 
scholars frequently define lobbying as a market mode of organization where interest groups 
provide expertise in exchange for influence (Lowery, 2007; Lowery & Gray, 2004). A sub-
optimal alignment may result if lobbying processes are a market mode of organization and the 
policies in question are idiosyncratic. Markets are characterized by high incentive structures 
with negligible control arrangements, while lobbying in the EU is increasingly organized 
through intermediate incentive structures and control arrangements, which are determined by 
the idiosyncrasy of the transactions. 
First, the role of nonprofits as legitimate partners in regulatory transactions has been 
increasingly recognized and institutionalized since the legitimacy crisis in the 1990s (EC, 
2001), which led to initiatives to transform EU governance in the 2000s (European 
Commission [EC], 2002). Nonprofits’ participation in policymaking is now codified in the 
Treaty of the EU and the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU. The EU justifies, for instance, 
financial support as an incentive to improve nonprofit capacity to strengthen civil society, 
improve governance, and develop policy (EC, 2015). Research shows that the number of 
interest groups in the EU, particularly nonprofits, is increasing (Greenwood & Dreger, 2013).
Second, incentive and dissuasion mechanisms have been implemented to control access. For 
instance, the EU Transparency Register (TR) is a database run by the TR Joint Secretariat 
(TRJS). Here, organizations and individuals seeking to access consultation processes 
voluntarily record operational information and information related to their activities in the EU 
(participation in EC groups, accreditation to the European Parliament [EP], etc.). The EC and 
the EP launched the TR in 2011e with the intention of improving transparency and 
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accountability in policymaking. The EP has announced its aspiration to make it mandatory 
(EP, 2015). 
Although registration in the TR is voluntary, studies indicate that registration amounts to de 
facto accreditation (Broscheid & Coen, 2007; Greenwood & Halpin, 2007). After the EU 
improved the technical aspects and the system of incentives in January 2015, registration 
increased, and it is probable that the large number of foundations registered from 2015 
onward is due to this change (Graph 1). The new incentives include patronage by the EC and 
EP, facilitated access to EP members and staff, participation as speakers in EP committee 
hearings, authorization to organize or co-host events at the EP, and the facilitated transmission 
of information by both institutions.
Third, processes of consultation (lobbying) have established rules of conduct. A set of 
principles and standards for consultation processes the EC developed has been in force since 
2003 (EC, 2002). These principles and standards establish equal treatment and inclusiveness 
as the main guiding principles for participation; further, openness, accountability, 
effectiveness, and publicity are the main guiding principles for the processes. The principles 
and standards also assign the responsibility for applying these principles to both parties 
involved: the EC and the interest groups. In parallel with this document, the EC developed the 
transparency portal, a website allowing users to access information on consultation processes.
The EU’s forms of consultation (lobby arenas) vary between open access and focused access. 
Open access consists of public consultations that are accessible online to organizations and 
individuals. Focused access is organized when the EU requires specific expert information. 
High-level groups, consultative committees, expert groups, and intergroups are examples of 
EU consultations with focused access. Focused consultations have established standards for 
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consultation, operation, and information use (e.g., EC, 2010). The EC has a register of 
“Expert Groups and Other Similar Entities”f that features lists of formal groups organized by 
the EC and informal groups organized by EC departments and other offices. Similarly, the EP 
has enforced rules on the organization and operation of intergroups since 1999 (EP, 1999). 
Unfortunately, the TR’s data are incomplete and do not allow for examination of a relation 
between these different types of organizations and hybrids in the empirical analysis.
4. Foundations participating in EU consultation processes
In this section, I analyze EU TR data on foundations with the aim of assessing how threats to 
costs and benefits determine patterns of foundation participation in EU regulatory 
environments. To this end, a number of variables that reflect foundations investments in 
participation in EU lobbying are used. 
4.1. Data
By the end of 2016, there were 11,081 individuals and entities registered in the TR.  Section 
III of the TR corresponds to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which is the global 
label given to foundations and associations among other nonprofits. In 2016, there were 2,793 
organizations registered as NGOs (25% of the total number of entries in the TR). Among 
these, there were 306 (11% of the NGOs). These foundations correspond to organizations 
reporting that they are legally registered as foundations and those self-identified as 
foundations. 
In the TR, foundations have to register organizational information (e.g., mission, legal status, 
address) and EU activity information (e.g., participation in high-level groups and intergroups, 
number of staff involved in EU activities, etc.). For the purposes of this analysis, the 
following items provided relevant and valid information: EU initiatives followed, 
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participation in high-level groups and intergroups, number of full time equivalent (FTE) staff 
involved in EU activities, number of staff accredited to the EP, estimated costs of 
participating in EU activities (absolute and range), and financial return. 
The statistical analysis was limited because foundations do not extensively report on the EU 
initiatives they follow, their participation in high-level groups, or their participation in 
intergroups. Therefore, only 66 foundations were included in the analysis of regulatory 
environments. The regulatory environment (Figure 2), followed by each foundation and the 
policy type, were classified after examining EU initiatives followed, participation in high-
level groups, and participation in intergroups. Policy topics were classified according to the 
division of competences within the EU.g To ensure classification reliability, a second 
researcher conducted a blind classification. 
The variable regulatory environment had four values: 0 = clientelist, 1 = interest group, 
2 = entrepreneurial, and 3 = majoritarian. The variable policy type followed a scale from 
0–23. Because the number of foundations reporting absolute estimated costs was limited, the 
estimated costs as a range, which all foundations reported, were included in the analysis. The 
estimated costs as a range were converted to a scale using the end value of each range. 
Absolute numbers were used for EP staff accredited, FTE, staff involved, estimated costs 
(absolute and range), and revenue. 
Non-parametric tests where applied in the statistical analysis because the sample is non-
normally distributed. A Fisher’s exact test was conducted for the statistical analysis between 
policy types and policy environments because 98.5% of the cells had an expected count of 
less than five. A Kruskal–Wallis test was used to analyze between environments and the 
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remaining variables because the former is a categorical variable with four values and the latter 
is continuous. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics
The characteristics of foundation lobbying in the EU are somewhat different than those of 
European foundations located globally. The majority of foundations lobbying in the EU have 
head offices in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Poland; they host half of the foundations that 
are registered in the TR (Table 1). Regarding the distribution of foundations in Europe, 
Germany has the largest number (roughly 19,150), followed by Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the Netherlands (Fondation de France & CerPhi, 2015). 
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Table I. 306 foundations by country
Head office’s country
Number of 
foundations per 
country
Argentina, Bosnia-herzegovina, Canada, Hong 
Kong, Israel, Kyrgyztan, Lituania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Philippines, Singapore, Slovakia, Ukraine
1
Albania, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, 
Malta, Slovenia
2
Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland 3
Greece, Norway 4
Sweden 5
France, Romania 6
Italy, Spain 10
United States 15
Switzerland 17
Germany, United Kingdom 20
Poland 23
Belgium 30
Netherlands 96
Total 306
Source: Elaborated with data from the EU Transparency Register (2017).
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The total revenue that the 306 foundations reported amounts to 6.17 billion Euros, and the 
median revenue is 0.54 million Euros (Table 2). This amount is far from the average 
endowment of foundations in Western Europe, which amounts to between 3.5 and 4.5 million 
Euros (FF & CerPhi, 2015). 
The 66 foundations included in the sample do not significantly differ from the 306 
foundations registered in the TR. Foundations both at the population and sample levels focus 
significantly on 4 of the 23 EU policy topics: environment, health, freedom, security and 
justice, and internal market (Graph 3).
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Graph 3. Number of foundations by EU policy topic 
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Education, training and youth
Energy
Enlargement
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EU citizenship
Foreign and security policy
Fraud prevention
Freedom, security and justice
Health
Industry
Internal market
Maritime affairs and fisheries
Regional policy
Research and innovation
Social policy
306 foundations 66 foundations
Source: Adapted from the EU Transparency Register (2017).
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The FTE staff numbers are similar for both the foundation population and for the sample with 
one FTE staff (Table 2). The numbers change slightly for EP-accredited staff (Md = two EP-
accredited staff for the population and three for the sample). The total revenue of the sample 
accounts for 26% of the population; therefore, their median return is higher. The median 
estimated costs (as absolute amounts) are higher for the sample than for the population 
(52,000 Euros and 39,865 Euros, respectively). The estimated costs as a range start at 0–9,999 
and end at >10,000,000. For both the population and the sample (145 and 30 foundations, 
respectively), the majority of the foundations report costs in the range of 0–9999.
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Table II. Comparative values of variables 
Foundations
FTE
Estimated costs 
(absolute 
amount)
EP accredited 
staff Revenue
Population 
(306)
Md 1.25 39865 Euros 2 541849 Euros
s 1798.75
21.66 million 
Euros
185
6176.19 
million Euros
n 306 70 63 283
% from population 100 23 21 92
Sample (66)
Md 1 52000 Euros 3 871018 Euros
s 246.75 728203 Euros 73
1593.47 
million Euros
n 66 12 20 63
% from population 22 4 7 21
Source: Elaborated with data from the EU Transparency Register (2017).
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4.3. Results 
Foundations’ participation in regulatory transactions does not follow the predicted curve for 
interest groups (Graph 2). The foundations analyzed here participate in entrepreneurial and 
clientelist environments to a similar degree (17 foundations in each), and they participate 
significantly more than in interest group environments (7 foundations) (Figure 2). 
Importantly, foundations significantly participate in majoritarian environments. Figure 2 gives 
some examples of the EU initiatives followed by the foundations in each regulatory 
environment. 
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Figure 2. Some EU initiatives followed by 66 foundations, by regulatory environment (number of foundations) 
Source: Regulatory environments adapted from Wilson (1974, 1989), EU initiatives adapted from the EU Transparency Register (2017).
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The Fisher’s exact test shows an association between policy type and policy environment 
variables: x2 (n = 66) p = .000. Further observation of the distribution of policy types shows 
that the most prominent policy in clientelist environments is internal market, followed by 
health (Figure 3); in interest groups, it is freedom, then security and justice; in entrepreneurial 
environments, it is health followed by environment; and in majoritarian environments, it is 
environment. If the majoritarian environment conservation of marine biological resources is 
added to environment (44% and 12 %, respectively), the total percentage of environmental 
issues increases to 56%. Moreover, four of the main policies in question move along vertical 
and horizontal axes (the dashed lines in Figure 3). The axes suggest that internal market and 
health policies are somewhat determined by certain threats to costs because they move along 
the clientelist and entrepreneurial axis. In parallel, freedom and security and justice move 
along the interest group and majoritarian axis, suggesting that distributed costs determine the 
environment. Finally, the organization of environmental policy along the 
entrepreneurial–majoritarian axis suggests that distributed benefits are an important 
determinant. 
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Figure 3. Main EU policies followed by foundations, by regulatory environment (percentage of foundations), and key axes of distribution of some 
policies
Source: Regulatory environments adapted from Wilson (1974, 1989), EU initiatives adapted from the EU Transparency Register (2017)
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The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test show that human resources (staff involved and FTE 
staff) are distinctively invested in majoritarian environments, while EP-accredited staff and 
financial resources (estimated costs and revenue) are similarly distributed across 
environments (Table 3). Further examination shows that the median number of staff involved 
and FTE staff in majoritarian environments more than doubles staff involved and FTE staff of 
each remaining environment (Md = 5 staff involved, 2.5 FTE staff).
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Table III. Kruskal-Wallis tests 
Persons 
involved FTE
EP 
accredited
Costs 
(absolut
e 
amount)
Costs 
(range) Revenue
Chi-Square 8.909 8.417 2.799 2.186 2.902 .274
df 3 3 3 3 3 3
Asymp. Sig. .031 .038 .424 .535 .407 .965
Source: Elaborated with data from the EU Transparency Register (2017).
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5. Discussion 
The results show that foundations lobbying in the EU are somewhat distinct from the overall 
population of foundations in Europe in terms of distribution of resources and the countries 
they represent. This difference calls for more research, but it may have to do with subjects of 
interest (Graph 3), where only some foundations are attracted to the policy issues regulated at 
the EU level. Further research should consider whether these foundations tend to bypass 
national politics and engage directly in EU politics for the policy topics in question (e.g., Dür 
& Mateo, 2012; Rodela, Udovč, & Boström, 2016). Attitudes toward policymaking as a mode 
of organizing transactions may be another reason. For instance, while Belgian foundations 
tend to react passively to the idea of social change through policy engagement (Pirotte, 2007), 
Dutch foundations tend to respond actively (Gouwenberg, van der Jagt, & Schuyt, 2007). 
These attitudes are related to Wilson’s model —based on interest groups’ perceptions of 
benefits and costs—; therefore, they should be further studied via this model.
Contrary to the basic premises of the model, the results show that foundations significantly 
participate in majoritarian environments. Moreover, foundations’ engagement in majoritarian 
environments is driven to some extent by their assessment of distributed benefits, while in 
clientelist and entrepreneurial environments, the main driver seems to be the costs. These 
results are in line with the argument that nonprofits, and foundations in particular, hold a 
distinctive position in this model compared to firms and unions, for example, as a result of 
their focus on the common good and particular capacity to represent highly fragmented 
interests (e.g., Anheier & Daly, 2007; Anheier & Leat, 2013; Prewitt, 2006). Moreover, these 
results are in line with the main argument posed in the introduction that foundations 
participate in EU policymaking for regulatory transactions that are too costly to solve inside 
the organization—in this case, highly fragmented interests that are difficult to define and 
mobilize. Nevertheless, the irregularity of foundation participation across regulatory 
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environments requires further in-depth analysis on foundations’ assessment of costs and 
benefits in their regulatory transactions. 
The results suggest that lobby budgets (estimated costs) are similarly distributed across 
regulatory policy environments. This contradicts research on interest group access to 
policymaking, which found that lobbying budgets are more important for “special interest 
groups” (usually concentrated in clientelist and entrepreneurial environments) than for 
“diffuse interest groups” (usually concentrated in interest group and majoritarian 
environments) (Rasmussen & Gross, 2015: 364). Nevertheless, Rasmussen and Gross (2015) 
studied interest groups globally. Consequently, my results add to those of Rasmussen and 
Gross, suggesting that for some types of interest groups, such as foundations, lobbying 
budgets do not vary across regulatory policies. Overall, the analysis suggests that applying a 
model that systematically orders policies and classifies interest groups may contribute to a 
more refined understanding of lobbying in the EU.
Finally, the results show that the density of human resources (i.e., staff involved and FTE 
staff) is greater in majoritarian environments than in the remaining regulatory environments. 
These results are difficult to analyze. It could be argued that the difficulties in identifying and 
understanding the implications for beneficiaries and cost bearers of majoritarian transactions 
impel EU institutions to seek a wide number of experts in these environments, as per the 
example of the ECNC in legislating IAS. Nevertheless, large numbers of staff does not imply 
that they provide idiosyncratic policy advice, nor does it imply that there is frequent or 
significant contact between the staff and EU politicians and other interest groups. The role of 
experts is one of the most challenging issues in interest group research (e.g., Chalmers, 2013; 
Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2008, 2011). Nevertheless, the results reflect the importance of 
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foundations investing in staff in order to advance in majoritarian environments, a finding that 
requires further study.
This study has several limitations in addition to the weaknesses of the data in terms of 
exhaustiveness and sample size. The analysis concentrates on foundations and calls for 
comparative research that contrasts these with other nonprofit organizations and interest 
groups such as firms and consultants. A comparative approach would refine the model by 
explaining the cost–benefit assessment of different policy actors and their priorities in 
regulatory transactions. Furthermore, this analysis concentrates on costs (financial and staff 
investments) and overlooks the assessment of benefits, which seem to play an important role 
at least for foundations. Accordingly, because the identification of added value is a feature of 
hybrids (Ménard, 2010, 1013), further research should explore the cost–benefit logic that 
impels foundations to engage in public agency regulatory transactions.
Conclusion
Advancing our understanding of nonprofit cooperation requires using models and approaches 
suited for this purpose. This article proposed a transaction costs economic (TCE) approach to 
analyze a form of cooperation that is widely used in economics and organization studies: 
hybrids. Following the efficient alignment hypothesis, the TCE approach provides tools to 
model how nonprofits decide to pursue their transactions through hybrids and examine the 
organizational characteristics of different modes of hybrids. As a result, hybrids are a useful 
tool to further the comparative research on nonprofit cooperation.
I hypothesized that foundations cooperate in EU policymaking to conduct regulatory 
transactions that are too costly to solve individually. Accordingly, the results show that 
foundations lobby on regulatory environments, and significantly, on those of a majoritarian 
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nature (where the beneficiaries and the cost bearers of a policy are highly fragmented and are 
difficult to mobilize as a group), such as the EU regulation on IAS. Among the regulatory 
environments examined, the majoritarian corresponds to the hybrid with the highest 
coordination costs. Moreover, the results suggest that foundations are driven into majoritarian 
environments by not only the costs, but also the benefits, of the transactions. Thus, as the TCE 
approach to hybrids suggests, the lobbying motivations for foundations are related to the 
added value that they perceive. This augments previous research on nonprofits (Almog-Bar, 
2013; AL-Tabbaa, Leach, & March, 2014), which found that added value is a key element 
driving nonprofit cooperation. Consequently, further research adopting the TCE approach to 
hybrids should improve the operationalization of the cost–benefit relation of nonprofit 
cooperation. Finally, this research contributes to TCE by shedding light on the specificities of 
the nonprofit logic of transaction costs, which according to the results, may differ from those 
of firms.
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Notes
a See https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/private-foundations/lobbying-activity-of-
section-501-c-3-private-foundations 
b See https://trust.guidestar.org/perspectives-on-the-johnson-
amendment?utm_campaign=GuideStar+Newsletter+-
+Researchers+and+Media&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=4275
0102&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-
8342u549mLXOy33a4rzs8KLvT0g94wc8jr5ypfB6GkeLnZMuAfswXXWmBHRdfWxsCZro
HmrJjr12lkxfUelAFyEClYLg&_hsmi=42750102
c See the list of participants here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=
2210&NewSearch=1&NewSearch=1
d See, for example, collective action (Commons, 1950: 23), congress and environments 
(Wilson, 1989: 248). 
e Previously, each institution had separate registers (Greenwood & Dreger, 2013; Greenwood, 
2011).
f See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=faq.faq&aide=2 
g See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:ai0020&from=EN
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